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The Economists of Tomorrow:




‘If you put two economists in a room,you get two opinions,unless one of
them is Lord Keynes,in which case you get three.’Winston Churchill
Abstract
This paper,on behalf of the UK-based Association for Heterodox Economists (AHE),
argues for a reformulation of the Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
(SBSE) on pluralist principles.
Pluralism – the capacity to examine critically a range of explanations for observed
reality – should be the primary required outcome of economics education.Speciﬁc
provisions should recognise,promote,defend and guarantee this good practice in
teaching and assessment alike.
Such a revision,it argues,is the appropriate response to widespread criticism of
economics,to which the monotheoretic character of its practice has laid the
profession open,following the recession which began early in 2008.
Introduction
This paper outlines the rationale for,and principles behind,a pluralist Subject
Benchmark Statement for Economics (SBSE).I ﬁrst deﬁne pluralism,contrasting it
with its opposite,monotheoreticism.I show that,as a consequence of this
deﬁnition,a pluralist SBSE would involve a radical rewrite,rather than an
incremental revision,of the existing SBSE.This in turn would rest on a
reconceptualisation of the relation between economics and society,bringing the
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should be the capacity to handle disagreement:to identify,select,adapt,and
critically interrogate the range of theories relevant to each concrete problem.Only
on the basis of these principles can tomorrow’s economists hope to confront each
juncture with the fresh minds required to understand it.This is the rational basis for
pluralism in economics – and hence for pluralism in economics education.
Pluralism is a radical break with the idea that economic knowledge should seek to
reduce itself to a canonical set of principles or techniques,which arises from the
mistaken attempt to assert a unity where none has been achieved.The outcome is
a dissolution of thought into a variety of contesting monisms – the neoclassical
approach,the neo-Austrian approach,Keynesianism,Marxism,and so on,each
seeking to establish itself as the single unique truth.
This unseemly struggle nurtures the misconception that pluralism is a ploy to
replace one orthodoxy by another.Actually,critical pluralist economics aims to
replace all orthodoxy with a real understanding of variety.It aims to equip
practitioners to select,from all appropriate theories,that which best ﬁts the
evidence.To achieve this,students ﬁrst need to understand,not where economists
agree,but why they disagree.
Pluralism thus goes hand in hand with critical thinking.Beyond the different
predictions of conﬂicting theories,the student needs to grasp the premises on
which each rests.Consider,for example,the efficient markets hypothesis,which has
ﬁgured extensively in recent criticism of the performance of economics.Buiter
(2009) argues that:
In both the New Classical and New Keynesian approaches to monetary
theory (and to aggregative macroeconomics in general),the strongest
version of the efficient markets hypothesis (EMH) was maintained.This is
the hypothesis that asset prices aggregate and fully reﬂect all relevant
fundamental information,and thus provide the proper signals for resource
allocation.Even during the seventies,eighties,nineties and noughties
before 2007,the manifest failure of the EMH in many key asset markets was
obvious to virtually all those whose cognitive abilities had not been warped
by a modern Anglo-American Ph.D.education.But most of the profession
continued to swallow the EMH hook,line and sinker,although there were
inﬂuential advocates of reason throughout,including James Tobin,Robert
Shiller,George Akerlof,Hyman Minsky,Joseph Stiglitz and behaviourist
approaches to ﬁnance.The inﬂuence of the heterodox approaches … was,
however,strictly limited.
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subject closer to its sister social sciences.I establish this by considering the
widespread criticism of economics that followed the ﬁnancial crash and ensuing
recession which opened in 2008.
What is pluralism?
Pluralism restores the lost academic principle of controversy to economics.It
recognises that both the effective development of theory,and its valid application,
depend for optimality on the debate between contrasting and opposed ideas.
Within economics,pluralism has been misrepresented as a synonym for
heterodoxy.In fact,the very polarisation of our subject into orthodoxy and
heterodoxy – one of many phenomena unique to this subject – arises because of
the monotheoretic1 conception that the job of an economist is to pursue a single
theory or theoretical paradigm,identiﬁed in advance of the evidence,without
considering conﬂicting alternatives.‘Orthodox’economics,at any given time,
singles out one such body of theory as meritorious.Heterodoxy arises precisely and
only when orthodoxy treats other ideas as undeserving of merit for no valid reason
beyond mere disagreement.
The pluralist economist makes explicit the alternative theoretical approaches
relevant to any given problem,whether or not she or he agrees with them,
presenting the different solutions and policies which might arise from each
approach,the presuppositions on which it rests,and the basis – in any given case
– for choosing between them.
Pluralism has wider implications for the relation between society and economics,
whose close and direct relation to policy-making is also unique to the subject.In the
monotheoretic framework,this relation is conceived of,by both client and provider,as
one in which the economist provides the single ‘right answer’which the
decision-maker then adopts.Pluralism,by contrast,presents the decision-makers with
choices,thus ensuring they cannot absolve themselves as merely ‘acting on advice’.
Pluralism,in summary,rests on two foundations.The ﬁrst is a different conception
of economic theory,closer to our subject’s sister social sciences.The second is a
different conception of competent economic practice,closer to Dearing’s (1997)
description of the modern UK approach as a ‘compact between higher education
and society’.
What pluralism is not
Pluralism,as thus conceived,embeds the principle of controversy in the deﬁnition
of economic theory.The deﬁning characteristic of the economist of tomorrowThe Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
27
without prior prejudice,we must confront each approach,excluding none,with the
evidence as it emerges – and then judge between them.
Pluralism is not a method contrary to that of the sciences but the method of the
sciences,as Fullbrook (2001,2008) has accurately shown,drawing on a wealth of
work in the philosophy of science.
There is no evidence that pluralism constitutes a relaxation of professional
standards.It is far more difficult – but also far more necessary – to understand,and
represent fairly,a point of view with which one disagrees,than simply to repeat
one’s own beliefs or,worse still,the beliefs of one’s superiors.Moreover,it is greatly
more probable that a student who understands the arguments against any theory
will truly grasp what that theory actually says.
Pluralism is not relativism.It does not give researchers or students license to
assume whatever they feel happy with.To the contrary,it requires competent
economists to be conversant with theories they may be singularly unhappy with.
Ginger Rogers once remarked she had to do everything Fred Astaire did,but
backwards and in high heels.Pluralist economists pursue not only their own
preferred line of thought but also that of their own main opponents.During the
consultation process which gave rise to this paper,the commonest objection was
that pluralism was difficult for students,who did not like having to understand so
many theories.This is true,but it cannot simultaneously be claimed that pluralism is
difficult and that it will lead to lax standards.
Two further beneﬁts of pluralism are thus clariﬁed:it constrains the economist to
react creatively to unsolved problems,and it inculcates a spirit of theoretical
enquiry.In both cases it denies the practitioner the luxury of retreating to
mechanical formulae which,while they may well have been tried,cannot
legitimately be described as tested.
The myth of synthesis and the case for assertive benchmarking
Having deﬁned pluralism and established its advantages,I next consider the
benchmark statement itself,putting the case for what I term ‘assertive’2 pluralism
– the introduction of pluralism as a requirement,rather than an option.In doing so I
address the most common response to the AHE’s case:that the benchmark is
already pluralist,since it already includes the whole range of economic ideas.This
argument rests on two assertions:ﬁrst,that,by synthesising the whole of economic
theory,the SBSE is already pluralist since nothing has been left out;second,that it
contains permission to explore alternatives.
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The EMH,he rightly notes,became an implicit assumption in ﬁnancial theory.Yet it is
a hypothesis,not a proven theory.The possibility should have been considered that
circumstances might arise in which it was not valid,if only to identify when it might
be valid.To be competent to undertake such questioning,practitioners were needed
who both recognised that it was not an established fact,and who understood at
least some approaches which do not presume perfect coordination.A shortlist
includes Keynes’s vigorous critique of Say’s Law;the Austrians’critique of Walrasian
assumptions;Marx’s startlingly relevant account of capitalist crisis,Schumpeter’s
notion of creative destruction,and behavioural accounts such as Shiller’s.
Students trained to appreciate these alternative hypotheses would also have
understood historical context.Having absorbed the lessons of a past stage of
history,they could have dusted off their History of Economic Thought textbooks to
study the relation between 2009 and 1929.They would have recollected the
warnings of Galbraith and Minsky,and realised that received opinions on the role of
the banks and the state should be set aside once their presupposed conditions no
longer applied.
Pluralistic education would thus have equipped today’s economists with an
understanding of the alternatives to EMH-based models even if the latter furnished
their method of choice.As the crisis approached,they could have recognised the
relevance of Keynes’s theory of liquidity preference,the importance of ﬂow-of-
funds accounting,and the business-cycle disputes of the 1920s which gave us both
the NBER’s and Hayek’s theories of the trade cycle.Acquaintance with Schumpeter
would have sensitised them to the importance of underlying long trends,and they
would have been attuned to behaviouralist and institutionalist critiques.
Two initial beneﬁts of pluralism can now be summarised:it equips the economist to
check,regularly and critically,the assumptions that inform any judgement and
refrain from employing them in the absence of solid evidence.And it equips the
economist to respond to new or unanticipated phenomena.
A second,prevalent misconception is to see pluralism as an excuse for laxity.
Pluralism is not a substitute for a standard:it is a standard.
Pluralism does not claim there is no such thing as truth or falsehood.It does state
that the ultimate test of theory is evidence.The purpose of research is to judge
what is true,and the purpose of education is to equip students to make
judgements.These may not be made in advance of conducting empirical tests.We
do not yet know whether the present crisis is best understood using the approach
of Buiter,Shiller,Krugman,Friedman,Keynes,Schumpeter or Marx.Therefore,The Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
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transcends.Even a synthesis that has been achieved – let alone a ﬁeld of
knowledge in the fractured state of modern economics – systematically deploys
controversy as the founding principle of theory,understanding,and action.
Understanding controversy is not an optional extra.
It is for this reason that the SBSE falls short in proposing that the student should
‘display familiarity with the possibility that many economic problems may admit of
more than one approach and may have more than one solution’(Quality Assurance
Agency for Higher Education,2007:8) or in requiring that a possible attainment of
an economics student might be ‘Appreciation of the history and development of
economic ideas and the differing methods of analysis that have been and are used
by economists’.
At ﬁrst sight,this is so bland that it appears that no theory could possibly be
excluded.But neither statement requires the competent student to understand a
variety of theories or the reason for their differences.The latter,for example,comes
in a list of possible attainments immediately after a disclaimer stating that which
elements on the list were actually selected is a matter of individual institutional
choice.The student’s education,so deﬁned,cannot but omit the great majority of
theories the student should be required to know – the omissions,moreover,being
selected by the institution and not the student.
A second defence of the SBSE is that,by stating some kind of common
denominator in all economic theory,it leaves nothing out but creates a space for
everything.This is not true either.The end effect of an Ibsenesque urge to conceal
unresolved differences is both suppressive and repressive.
This is clearest in the SBSE’s apparently innocent attempt to deﬁne the subject as
the ‘study of the factors that inﬂuence income,wealth and well-being’,aiming at the
‘allocation,distribution and utilization of scarce resources’.The attempt at
inclusiveness is welcome,but fails.It presents a single,deeply contested view as a
common denominator.Marxism for example,could never sign up to it and it is
decreasingly likely that ecological economics could do so – both having converged
on the alternative consensus that scarcity is a socially created phenomenon,not an
external ‘given’of economic analysis.
The problem is,then,what happens if an institution assents to such a benchmark.If
it takes the SBSE seriously,it should exclude all those alternative approaches that
conceive of scarcity as socially constructed,on elementary Aristotelian grounds,
since a contingent feature of the ﬁeld of study cannot possibly be a part of its
founding basis.
International Review of Economics Education
28
Any statement that the benchmark explicitly speciﬁes a range of ideas is demonstrably
false.One searches it in vain for behaviouralism,evolutionary economics,feminism,
Keynesianism,Marxism,or any identiﬁable body of theory.The defence rests,therefore,
on the idea that such ideas are already implicitin the SBSE.However,one need only
compare economics with its siblings to see how far its benchmark is from standard
practice in the social sciences (Freeman 2007).3The benchmark statement for politics
makes no attempt to present a prescriptive synthesis;indeed,it explicitly guards
against it and names the alternatives to be considered:
The scope of politics and international relations is broad,the boundaries
often being contested or in movement.Perhaps in no other academic
discipline are the subject matter and approaches so much in contention
and in ﬂux … International political theory could be taught as contending
approaches such as realism,neo-realism,neo-liberalism,institutionalist
theory,feminism,pluralism,Marxism or critical theory;it could also be
taught as normative theory.
Our colleagues in geography are yet more explicit that plurality is a positive virtue:
any attempts at prescription must be discarded;institutions offering degree
programmes in geography must be free to decide upon the details of
content and organisation.A valued characteristic of the discipline is its
plurality of ways of knowing and understanding the world.
It is both disconcerting and revealing to discover that economics is more
committed to the unity of its doctrines than theology,whose benchmark simply
states that
Much of the excitement of the discipline lies in its contested nature.
The idea of a single,prescriptive statement of content is unique to economics,and
also appears to be a late addition,formalised in the neoclassical synthesis.Yet both
this,and the benchmark statement,constitute not a true synthesis but a syncretism.
Syncretism is deﬁned by the Oxford English Dictionary as the 
[A]ttempted union or reconciliation of diverse or opposite tenets or
practices,esp.in philosophy or religion;spec.the system or principles of a
school founded in the 17th century by George Calixtus,who aimed at
harmonizing the sects of Protestants and ultimately all Christian bodies 
(The Oxford English Dictionary,1989)
True synthesis is not an amalgam of fragments from views that utterly conﬂict with
each other but,as any student of Hegel can testify,rests on the contradictions itThe Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
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A third example:the standard microeconomic theory of supply and demand.
Objections and alternatives to that theory come from many quarters:from all critics
of Say’s Law such as Marx and Keynes;from Chamberlin’s conception of
‘monopolistic competition;from the behaviouralists and the institutionalists;from
studies of particular markets that do not comply with the theory of perfect
competition,such as labour markets as analysed by Manning (2003) and by Card
and Krueger (2001);from Kaleckian theories of price formation;from feminist
economics;from the literature on imperfect information and bounded rationality;
and so on.These are subjects of vigorous dispute.The mark of competence should
no longer be exclusive mastery of any one approach but the ability to offer the
decision-maker a reasoned choice between them.
A fourth example comes from the theory of trade.A competent pluralist
practitioner should clearly understand Ricardo’s theory of comparative advantage;
however,this is insufficient.Why? From the standpoint of much modern teaching,
this theory has been ‘extended and built on’– for example,by Heckscher-Ohlin
theory.A pluralist standpoint,in contrast,requires familiarity with the theory’s
theoretical challengers – from Mercantilism through the Listian corpus to
modern-day developmental nationalism,within development theory from Arthur
Lewis to Prebisch and Singer,the arguments of the Dependency School and the
critiques of the modern anti-globalisation theory,through to the New Trade Theory
of Fujita,Krugman and Venables (1999).Not least,he or she would understand why
Ricardian theory has been so rarely applied and why the alternative tradition,which
Reinert (2004) terms the ‘other canon’,held so much sway.
Students exposed to these ideas would understand Ricardo’s theory far better than
those trained simply to reproduce its mathematical basis,logically beautiful though
this is,because they would understand not merely what Ricardo was arguing in
favour of but what he was arguing against;and they would understand in turn the
assaults on Ricardo made since that time,and the responses of his defenders.
The systemic failure of economics
Thus far,I have outlined the positive reasons for a revision of the SBSE,in explaining
why its results would be superior.However,the argument is incomplete without
considering the other side of the coin,namely,the negative consequences of the
existing benchmark.The primary rationale for a rapid and thorough reconsideration
is the widespread public criticism of the profession which followed the ﬁnancial
crash and recession that opened in 2007.
This reconsideration cannot be avoided for two reasons:ﬁrst,the response is prima
facie evidence of the considerable ﬂaws in the existing practice of economics
International Review of Economics Education
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This suppression is self-inﬂicted:a prescriptive deﬁnition is unnecessary;no other
social science has done it,the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA,
2004:para 5)4 counsels against it,and it is perfectly legitimate to deﬁne a subject by
its differences.
Critical pluralism as the foundation of a subject benchmark
Competence,in a pluralist economics thus envisaged,is the capacity to think
originally and independently.This in turn requires what I term ‘critical pluralism’.
Students should be required to understand what theories presuppose and to
subject these presuppositions – not just their immediate predictions – to the
empirical test of evidence.They should also demonstrate the capacity to make
independent judgements between theories on this basis.
This is not some kind of ‘soft’alternative to producing valid and excellent theory
but is the way to produce it.Competence thus deﬁned is not the ability to
reproduce and conform to a canon but the capacity to think outside it.It thus tests
not just the students’knowledge of what the experts and teachers have to say but
their understanding of what their opponents also say.
An example should clarify this point.The SBSE asserts that ‘analysis is both static …
and dynamic’.This statement is plain wrong.It is not possible to be static and
dynamic any more than to stand up whilst falling down:a theory may be static or
dynamic.It is a well-established mathematical truth that the solution to a
differential or difference equation system bears no necessary relation to the ﬁxed
point of the system,will not converge on it,average to it,have it as its centre of
gravity,or even in general possess it as a strange attractor.Not surprisingly,
therefore,the static and dynamic approaches in all but the most trivial cases simply
yield different results.
Not surprisingly,also,the history of theory is riven with conﬂict between those who
favour one such result over another.Between non-equilibrium approaches
associated with Keynes,Marx and the Austrians,on the one hand,and the
comparative static approach of Walras and his successors,on the other,lies a
century of dispute;this is a choice,not a bygone family spat.
How,then,should we determine,in any given situation,whether a dynamic or static
approach is superior? By confronting both theories with the evidence:by
considering their presuppositions and predictions,and asking which conforms to
the known facts.The SBSE should have speciﬁed ‘analysis will explore the reasons
for the conﬂict between static and dynamic approaches’.Beneath these two
opposed speciﬁcations lies a conceptual and paradigmatic abyss.The Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
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happens to it.The critics’complaint is that the system,as a whole,delivered wrong
results:that the considered advice given to decision-makers was grounded in
erroneous theory.The touchstone is not whether dissence existed but how it
affected the advice normally given,the theories normally used,and the
qualiﬁcations normally awarded.
Economics and the treatment of dissent
The distinguishing feature of Buiter’s list of dissenters,given earlier,is that,had they
been considered,different economic judgements would have been offered to
decision-makers.The ‘select club of the seers who saw it all coming’as the Times
describes it (Pettifor 2008) extends,but is by no means limited,to Roubini (Mihm
2008),Brenner (2002),Shiller (2006),Turner (2008),Pettifor (2006),Stiglitz (2008) and
Wade (2008).
The approach among the profession’s orthodox,I will argue,is not that such
dissenting views are wrong but that it does not need to consider them.The point is
clearly,if perhaps unintentionally,made by Portes (2008),outgoing Secretary-
General of the Royal Economics Society,in his valedictory address to the Society.
Questioning 
administrators,who may not have deep disciplinary backgrounds,[who]
nevertheless impose their own views rather than deferring to professional
standards
he singles out for derision a referee who rejects a funding proposal with the words
despite the excellence of the partners’record within mainly economic
science,they fail to include alternative,complementary or even competing
approaches.
Portes laments that ‘Referees like these have regrettably been taken seriously’.
Consider this text carefully.Actually,the administrators,from Portes’own testimony,
did not ‘impose their own views’;they asked the researcher to include views other
than his own.Portes’inadvertent but revealing deﬁnition of ‘professional standards’
is that research based on a single idea is superior and it is positively wrong to
consider anything else.
As early as 1992 this tendency was sufficiently threatening to move 44 economists,
including four Sveriges Riksbank Nobel Laureates,to sign a declaration in the
American Economic Review (Hodgson,et al,.1992) in defence of pluralism.It brought
no discernible improvement.There is countless further testimony that the standard
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arising from its abandonment of pluralism.Second,however,it corresponds to a
public duty.The QAA’s own criteria (2004:para 3) state that benchmark statements
are intended provide ‘a foundation for employers,public and others to have
conﬁdence in the academic awards of higher education institutions’.As I will now
show,this conﬁdence has manifestly eroded:pluralism is the only valid response.
Recent criticism of economics is unprecedented in living memory.While there is a
moment in every recession when moral panic sets in (see Freeman,1999),it would
be very unwise to dismiss the criticism this time.It covers the spectrum of views in
the profession ranging from Krugman (2009) or Stiglitz (2008) to Buiter (2009),
extends to its authoritative heights,and questions its most cherished beliefs.5
Whatever one may think of its validity,to deny its existence deﬁes the laws of
evidence.Colander et al.(2009) summarise what may reasonably be termed a
critical consensus:
If one browses through the academic macroeconomics and ﬁnance
literature,‘systemic crisis’appears like an otherworldly event that is absent
from economic models.Most models,by design,offer no immediate handle
on how to think about or deal with this recurring phenomenon.In our hour
of greatest need,societies around the world are left to grope in the dark
without a theory.That,to us,is a systemic failure of the economics
profession.
This is shared by such eminent practitioners as Alan Greenspan (cited in Norris,2008):
In recent decades,a vast risk management and pricing system has evolved
… A Nobel Prize was awarded for the discovery of the pricing model that
underpins much of the advance in derivatives markets.This modern risk
management paradigm held sway for decades.The whole intellectual
ediﬁce,however,collapsed in the summer of last year
Gillian Tett (2009) reports yet stronger charges from Financial Services Authority
(FSA) chairman,Adair,Lord Turner,which he made after his widely-reported lecture
on ﬁnancial regulation (Turner,2009):
In recent years,he argues,‘the whole efficient market theory,Washington
consensus,free market deregulation system’was so dominant that it was
somewhat like a ‘religion’.This gave rise to ‘regulatory capture through the
intellectual zeitgeist’(Tett,2009).
These all rebut the ill-considered claim that,since economics has produced
heterodox writers,it is already pluralist – a hypothesis akin to crediting Mary Tudor
with the rise of Protestantism.The issue is not whether dissent exists,but whatThe Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
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Keynesian once again:how economists change their minds
Lee and Harley (1998:41) studied the relation between rating,university status,and
the hiring of heterodox economists arising from the ﬁrst Research Assessment
Exercise (RAE) in 1992.They found an inverse correlation between rating and the
hiring of heterodox economists.The RAE itself made it difficult,if not impossible,for
dissenting economists to be hired in high-performing,well-funded,
research-oriented economics departments.
In the lowest ranked departments (RAE 2) 14 out of 63 – 26 per cent – of hirings
were heterodox.In departments ranked 3,the proportion was 9.7 per cent;in those
ranked 5 or 4,one economist hired in every 70 (1.4 per cent) was heterodox.
Lee’s research (2007) demonstrates that the review system goes beyond merely
securing ‘favour’for a particular idea:it eliminates the capacity to generate
alternatives.This is the logical outcome of an outlook which identiﬁes dissent with
poor quality.If there is only one correct view,it is self-evidently wasteful to invest in
producing any other.Contrarian research is not funded,dissident work is not
published,heterodox lecturers are not hired,and survivors are not promoted.
It must be stressed that this case does not depend on whether the theories
selected by this process are wrong or right.It arises from the risk they are wrong
– to which the profession should respond by maintaining the capacity to correct its
mistakes.This it has not done.If Wolf (2008) is to be believed,we are now all duty
bound to become Keynesians yet again – yet it takes years to become an
accomplished Keynesian macroeconomist.A specialism is an expertise,not a
fashion item.From whom should future economists learn ideas that differ from
those of their teachers? How can we nurture the dissidents that will be needed in
the next crisis?
Conformity necrotises the capacity for change.A minimum response to the critics
would be an urgent stock-take of heterodox resources,to ﬁnd out now whether
Britain’s premier institutions still possess the means to teach students anything
other than a discredited orthodoxy and,if not,to redirect funds to those who can.
Who regulates economics?
I have noted that,were there an external standard of quality,the risk of adverse
theoretical selection by even a narrowly based system might be reduced.What actual
external conditions govern the theories selected by the system I have analysed?
When all is said and done,the only real external constraint on economists is money.
Those who judge its policies,and those who beneﬁt,also pay for them.Why should
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view of an economist’s job is to acquire,from his peers,a single theory around
which consensus exists,and to apply it.
The institutional origin of systemic failure
Reduced to essentials,the behaviour of a regulated system depends on the
interaction between behavioural rules and institutional practice.I have identiﬁed
the informal,but effective,rules under which economics operates.How do these
affect its practice? They lead,I will show,to selection for conformity.Its practitioners
are dominated by a compulsion to agree.I will now show that this introduces two
risks:adverse theoretical selection,and – as Turner (2008) notes – regulatory capture.
The risk of adverse theoretical selection arises not from the way theories are
applied but from the process which veriﬁes them.If a theory can be veriﬁed
externally to a profession,conformity could conceivably ensure that this correct
theory is applied.But conformity as such is no more likely to enforce valid theory
than wrong theory.
The problem is precisely the lack of any criterion of relevance or tested mechanism
to verify economic theories externally.Economics has many outputs but few inputs.
It bows to no authority.It has no regulatory structure worth speaking of,nor a code
of either conduct or ethics.6 And it does not merely enforce theories:it produces
them.If it creates a wrong theory,the only safeguard against enforcing error as
assiduously as truth,it would appear,is peer review.
But peer review is not a safeguard against wrong theory.Peer endorsement,it is
well known,is an indicator of approval,not merit.Ample research demonstrates
that in the absence of explicit safeguards,assessors confuse dissent with poor
quality,assigning lower ratings when they simply disagree with what is said.7
The process that passes judgement also selects the judges.If those who share a
certain viewpoint assign higher quality ratings to those they agree with,these will
secure higher status.They will then themselves be disproportionately entrusted
with the function of judgement.Those who dissent – the ‘heterodox’– will attain
lower rankings and will be less likely to become judges.A positive feedback loop
will be established,selecting on no other basis than approval by the
representatives of orthodoxy.
Such a system possesses no mechanism for eliminating a wrong theory.Still more
alarming,over time it will eliminate,in the names of both efficiency and quality,the
intellectual capacity to generate correct theory.This,the evidence suggests,is what
has happened.The Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
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Conclusion:a new compact with society
At the heart of the choices before us lies a contradiction.We could return to the
pre-Dearing system,amounting to a kind of unregulated competition between
homogeneous theories,which still prevails in the USA.But this would not eliminate
the monotheoreticism of each individual theory,nor reduce the risks that one
particular ‘orthodox’theory will be captured.Another choice is enhanced external
regulation – a kind of ‘FSA for economists’.It may come to this,but if economics is
regulated by those it regulates,it is not clear how capture may be avoided.
Thus,a systematic rethink of the relation between the economist and society is
required.The problem is not just the consensus which economics has produced,
but the very fact that it strives to produce one.Both our profession,and society,
need to organise consciously to combat monotheoreticism wherever and however
it manifests itself.This is the foundation of assertive pluralism as a strategy.
In closing,I can illustrate this by scrutinising Anatole Kaletsky’s (2009) claim that ‘[i]n
the search for the ‘guilty men’responsible for the near-collapse of the global
economy,one obvious group of scapegoats has escaped blame:the economists.’By
this he means ‘the academic theorists who win Nobel prizes,or dream of winning
them’.
To see why these seemingly obscure academics deserve to be hauled out of
their ivory towers and put in the dock of public opinion,consider why the
bankers,politicians,accountants and regulators behaved in the egregious
ways that they have … The answer was beautifully expressed two
generations ago by John Maynard Keynes:‘Practical men,who believe
themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual inﬂuence,are usually
the slaves of some defunct economist.Madmen in authority,who hear
voices in the air,are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a
few years back.’
This judgement is open to question:bankers,politicians,accountants and
regulators are surely culpable if they have let themselves be deluded by such
scoundrels.Yet they,and opinion-formers such as Kaletsky,can only blame their
delusions on us for as long as we present ourselves as sole custodians of
unequivocal economic truth – and for as long as they demand it of us.If a new SBSE
can express this simple idea,a solid foundation for progress will be established.
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this matter? Because as Freeman and Kliman (2008) note,economics is uniquely
close to policy – notably,policy on which large fortunes depend.
Economics is itself a regulatory system.True,it does not directly intervene in
decision-making processes,or does so infrequently.However,it provides the
language of decisions,the bulk of which are allocative and monetary.It provides the
criteria used to judge whether decisions were right.To take just two examples:it
furnished the rationale for dismantling post-war regulatory constraints on ﬁnancial
institutions and for the structural adjustment programmes the IMF and World Bank
have demanded of debtor countries for the past 30 years.
Such decisions have enormous material consequences.It makes a real difference
when economic theory comes down on one side or the other of any dispute in
ﬁscal policy,bank regulation,trade policy,or wage and labour relations.Huge social
conﬂicts testify to the seriousness which the protagonists attach to economic
judgements.
The principle of cui bono is relevant.Whose fortunes depend on whether
hypotheses like EMH are adopted in the policy sphere? Clearly,those to whom the
decisions are applied – not least,governments and ﬁnancial institutions.
But these same institutions ﬁnance the economics profession.Governments and
ﬁnancial bodies directly employ most professional economists and are heavily
involved in processes which inﬂuence the selection of economic theories.They
award prizes,fund departments,hand out grants and consultancies and,in the case
of international monetary authorities,directly intervene in selecting personnel.The
risk attached – raised in Freeman (2009) – is well known to public choice theory
and,as noted,has been made explicit by the chair of the FSA.Regulatory capture
occurs when private interests which stand to be affected by policy decisions
intervene in the regulatory system to ensure it decides in their favour.8
No ﬁeld of human knowledge beneﬁts from such large quantities of goal-directed
funding from organisations whose interests directly depend on the conclusions
arrived at,with the possible exception of health.9Yet,as we have seen,economics
offers its practitioners almost no defence against the pressures that may arise.
This is the ﬁnal point:whether or not the reader accepts that regulatory capture has
occurred,the risks cannot be ignored.What guarantees can be offered against
them? The corrective,I argue,begins with the economists of tomorrow:namely,the
students of today.The Economists of Tomorrow: the Case for a Pluralist Subject Benchmark Statement for Economics
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Notes
* I am indebted to Fred Lee,who has been gently urging the Association for Heterodox
Economics (AHE) to present its case since it was founded;Victoria Chick who has
been actively involved at every stage of preparing it,Andy Denis for his editorial
support and the many AHE members whose views,we hope,played some part in
shaping it.The mistakes are all my own.The opinions expressed here do not purport
to represent any view except those of the AHE.
1 This term was introduced in Freeman and Kliman (2008).
2 I thank Andy Denis for this term.In Elsner (2009) ‘active pluralism’means something
very similar.
3 All subject benchmark excerpts reproduced in Freeman (2007).
4 Point 6 in the section entitled ‘Purpose of benchmarking’QAA (2004:2 para 5) states
that one of the needs to be borne in mind in drafting benchmark statements is ‘to
avoid producing a speciﬁcation of a detailed curriculum or programme and to avoid
prescribing approaches to teaching,learning and assessment’.
5 The succession of letters to the Queen,after she famously asked Professor Garicano
of the LSE why‘nobody saw the crisis coming’(Pierce,2008) is worthy of special note.
Early contributors included Nick Macpherson,permanent secretary at the Treasury,
and Goldman Sachs chief economist Jim O’Neill,who jointly and severally apologised
for ‘a failure of the collective imagination’.See also Hodgson (2009).Our reference
website www.emperorstailors.com contains a wider selection.
6 DeMartino (2008) proposes an economists’oath based on the Hippocratic Principle
‘First do no harm’.Many Harvard MBA Students (http://mbaoath.org/) now swear an
informal oath;Garvin claims to be the ﬁrst management school
(http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-151558443.html),with a formal oath of
honour.
7 Gans and Shepherd’s (1994) collection of peer-rejected classics of economics is justly
celebrated.Chubin and Hackett (1990:12) record widespread scepticism that peer
review selects for merit in the natural sciences.See also Ietto-Gilles (2008).
8 Thus Briody and Prenzler (1998) directly apply the term ‘systemic capture’to account
for regulatory capture which they deﬁne as the ‘procuration of an entire regulatory
system by the regulated industry’.
9 See for example Desai (1994) for a detailed analysis of the conduct of the think tanks
on which the Thatcher government drew,in motivating its economic policies.
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